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Abstract
Reification, fetishism, alienation, mastery, and control – these are some of the key
concepts of modernity that have been battered and beaten by postmoderns and
nonmoderns alike, with Bruno Latour, a nonmodern, discarding them most recently.
Critical of this approach, which creates a rift between moderns and nonmoderns, the
author engages in dialogue with modern thinkers – particularly Peter Berger, Thomas
Luckmann and Stanley Pullberg – with a view to recycling and redefining the concept
of reification from a nonmodern perspective. Marxian scholars associate reification
with an attitude of detachment and passivity. Drawing on two years of ethnographic
fieldwork in a Luvale-speaking region of northwest Zambia, Africa, the author seeks
to convert the negative and asymmetrical Marxian reading of reification, which places
subjects above objects, to a positive symmetry. Marx explained the capitalist econ-
omy through the lens of religion. Reversing the direction of symmetrical comparison,
the author considers the northwestern Zambian universe of ancestors and their
different mahamba manifestations in the form of spiritual beings, diseased bodies
and material objects through the lens of Marxian concepts, mainly reification and
fetishism. Three aspects of reification understood as a human universal come to light:
first, reification and animation entail each other both in the realms of materiality
(human bodies and material objects) and immateriality (concepts and spirits), being
best perceived as a form of fetishism. Reifacts are fetishes and fetishes are reifacts.
Second, because fetishes are animated and do things, reification is a form of engage-
ment with the world, a means to action and a tool for transformation. Third and last,
and without contradiction, reification entails engagement and detachment, action and
withdrawal, control and surrender. There is much to gain from recycling the old
concept of reification. In a non-partisan symmetrical perspective, the redefinition of
reification as fetishism yields a new, positive understanding of the place of material
and immaterial things in social life and the ways in which we humans apprehend the
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world and implicate those things in our projects and struggles. Reification is not an
impediment to action but a condition for action.
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Monsieur le Capital and Madame la Terre do their haunting
simultaneously as social characters and as mere objects.
(Karl Marx)
Ask someone to oﬀer an example of a fetish, and he or she will probably
mention a non-genital object of sexual gratiﬁcation, maybe velvet, a hand-
kerchief, or a foot; an object of religious veneration in some distant land,
maybe a crude carving or a stone; or an emblematic commodity in capit-
alist societies, maybe the cell phone or money itself. If your interlocutor is
an art aﬁcionado, he or she may also mention the avant-garde object, thus
completing the four classic arenas of the Euro-American fascination with
fetishism: sex, religion, economy and art. All these fetishes are material
objects. The word ‘fetish’ itself derives from the Latin facticius, ‘a thing
made’. As often, though, ‘things’ take the form not of material objects but
of abstractions apprehended as autonomous entities. Fetishes do not share
their ontological status, physical appearance, or functional attributes; they
share their being reifacts. To speak of fetishism is to speak of reiﬁcation,
the universal human tendency to apprehend abstractions as things.
Far from new, this insight appears in Karl Marx’s early writings as well
as in Capital, where Marx, speaking of commodity fetishism in capitalist
societies, deﬁnes it as a peculiar phenomenon in which ‘a deﬁnite relation
between men [assumes] the fantastic form of a relation between things’
(Marx, 1936 [1867]: 83). Two themes in Marx’s writings on commodity
fetishism have inspired my own work: one is Marx’s recognition of the
interconnectedness between fetishism and reiﬁcation (Fetischismus and
Verdinglichung in the original German). The other theme is what I call,
after Bruno Latour, symmetrical anthropology, or the tactful employment
of one and the same explanation or standard to the terms of our compari-
sons, however we deﬁne these relative terms and positions (Latour, 1993).
Marx sought to grasp the phenomenology of commodities in the capitalist
market through the lens of ‘the mist-enveloped regions of the religious
world’ (Marx, 1936 [1867]: 83), a world he encountered in the written work
of such literati as the French magistrate and philosopher Charles de
Brosses (1760), author of the term fe´tichisme.1 Marx writes: ‘[the capitalist
commodity] is a very queer thing, abounding in metaphysical subtleties
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and theological niceties’ (Marx, 1936 [1867]: 81). I rejoin Marx in uphold-
ing the value of symmetrical comparison.
This said, my anthropology diﬀers from Marx’s in important ways.
Marx brought the religious worlds of far-oﬀ territories to illuminate
capitalism. Reversing the direction of symmetrical comparison, I bring
the insights developed by Marx and Marxian scholars in the context of
capitalism to bear on the ancestral world of a Luvale-speaking region in
northwest Zambia, where I have conducted over two years of ﬁeldwork
on the topic of fetishism and divination (Silva, 2011).
I also diﬀer fromMarx in terms of the qualitative value that we ascribe
to fetishism and reiﬁcation. Both Marx and numerous scholars whom he
has inspired see fetishism and reiﬁcation in negative terms. In their view,
human subjects should never reduce themselves to objects, in the process
of forgetting their authorship of the world and granting autonomy to
their creations. Human subjects and material objects should never fuse or
become symmetrical. Marx is symmetrical when he explains economy
and religion using the same concepts, as noted. He is asymmetrical in
his treatment of subjects and objects. I will attempt to turn this asym-
metry into a positive symmetry by showing that reiﬁcation is intertwined
with animation wherever it appears, being best perceived not as a form of
false consciousness that results in paralysis but as a form of engagement
and transformative action.
To this end, I will engage in conversation with a group of select soci-
ologists whose work on reiﬁcation is discernibly Marxian in spite of their
disclaimers. I will not engage in direct dialogue with Marx, who used the
concept of reiﬁcation only once (Pitkin, 1987: 264),2 or even with
the Hungarian Marxist philosopher and literary critic Gyo¨rgy Luka´cs,
the ﬁrst scholar to fully develop the theoretical and political implications
of reiﬁcation, ultimately restricting this concept to the historical context of
late capitalism (Luka´cs, 1971 [1923]). I will instead converse with three
sociologists whose view of reiﬁcation, being Luka´csian, is once again sym-
metrical: I mean Peter Berger, Thomas Luckmann and Stanley Pullberg.
Two seminal publications will be at the center of this debate: ‘Reiﬁcation
and the sociological critique of consciousness’, an essay published in 1965
by Berger and Pullberg, and The Social Construction of Reality, a book
published one year later by Berger and Luckmann.3
Why, you may ask, revisit the old Marxian concept of reiﬁcation?
Have not poststructuralist and neocolonialist theorists put that concept
to rest once and for all, denouncing it as a western narrative steeped in
imperialism and the sort of dualisms typical of modernity (Bewes, 2002)?
Has not Latour, more recently, depicted Marxists as the moderns par
excellence, the strongest of believers in belief (Latour, 1993: 126)?
To build what he calls the Middle Kingdom, where the broken halves
of dualism are brought together and made whole, Latour critiques the
moderns and discards many of their concepts. Out the window he throws
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belief, magic, fact and fetish, fetishism and anti-fetishism, subject and
object, production, alienation, reiﬁcation, surpassing, mastery, and also
critical thought (Latour, 2010: 18, 35). These concepts, Latour notes, are
caught up in the Great Divide between a delusory us and a delusory
them, a free, masterful subject and an alienating object. But does the
important work of critiquing and suspending the belief in belief require
that we abandon valuable old concepts? Do we really need to throw the
baby out with the bath water?
Notwithstanding the brilliance and originality of Latour’s (1999, 2010)
factish theory – his Middle Kingdom – my ethnographic ﬁeldwork in
northwest Zambia has convinced me that there is much to gain from
recycling (not salvaging) the old concept of reiﬁcation and its long-time
associates mastery and control from the wasteland of modernity. I hope
that by critically engaging with Berger, Luckmann and Pullberg – all the
while drawing inspiration from both Marx and more recent scholars of
fetishism, including Latour4 – I can demonstrate that it is not possible to
understand fetishes as separate from reifacts. Fetishes are reifacts and
reifacts are fetishes. Nor is it possible to understand reifacts-fetishes as
separate from the hybrid control-surrender. Why create another Great
Divide between moderns and nonmoderns, depriving ourselves of the con-
tributions of the former? Here too I rather concentrate on bridgework and
let critical theorists and agnostic theorists, those who believe in belief and
those who suspend that belief, meet in the middle.5
With this project in mind, let us take for a start not Latour’s concept
of factish or hybrid or quasi-object quasi-subject, but the old, battered
deﬁnition of reiﬁcation that Berger and Luckmann present in their trea-
tise The Social Construction of Reality:
Reiﬁcation is the apprehension of human phenomena as if they were
things, that is, in non-human or possibly supra-human terms.
Another way of saying this is that reiﬁcation is the apprehension
of the products of human activity as if they were something else
than human products – such as facts of nature, results of cosmic
laws, or manifestations of divine will. Reiﬁcation implies that man is
capable of forgetting his own authorship of the human world . . .
The reiﬁed world is, by deﬁnition, a dehumanized world. It is
experienced by man as a strange facticity, an opus alienum over
which he has no control rather than as the opus proprium of his
own productive activity. (Berger and Luckmann, 1966: 82–3, italics
in the original)
I will use three key dimensions of reiﬁcation presented in this excerpt to
frame my critical appraisal and to structure this article: the apprehension
of human phenomena as things; the forgetting of human authorship and
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the consequent alienation of the producers from their products, a condi-
tion described by Berger and Luckmann as dehumanizing; and the pro-
ducers’ lack of control over their own products. The authors claim that
reiﬁcation is a universal phenomenon that recurs in space and time. I argue
that, for that very reason, we should not deﬁne it, as they do, in the terms
in which it becomes expressed in the historical context of late capitalism in
Europe and North America – as a dehumanizing condition. Reiﬁcation is
always and necessarily linked not with inertness but with responsiveness;
not with detachment but with involvement; not with passivity but with
activity; not with a lack of control over one’s products, but with a tighter
control over those products and the advantages they bring. In the end, a
diﬀerent view of mastery and control will surface: to regain control and
eﬀect change it is not suﬃcient to adopt a critical stance and come to terms
with the ‘objective’ fact that our reiﬁed world is after all our own creation,
and what we did ourselves we can undo. To regain control and eﬀect
change we must accept that, in that very process, we will relinquish con-
trol, forget our authorship, and infuse our products with both reality and
anima. There is no control without surrender; there is no transformation
without reiﬁcation.
Much like fetishism, reiﬁcation has been negatively depicted time and
again. On one side, Marxian scholars have denounced reiﬁcation as a
misapprehension and a form of distorted praxis. On the other side,
Whiteheadian scholars have deﬁned reiﬁcation (hypostatization) as the
‘fallacy of misplaced concreteness’, the name given by the mathematician
and philosopher Alfred Whitehead (1925: 74–5) to the tendency among
intellectuals to see their analytic concepts as autonomous things. In spite
of all this negativity, I have found the old and loaded idea of reiﬁcation
most illuminating and thought-provoking, and have emerged from my
voyage through modernity with a new, positive understanding of the
place of things in social life and the ways in which we humans apprehend
the world and implicate those things in our projects and struggles.
I have also learned that there is much to gain from overcoming the
pervasive tendency in academia to separate the study of reiﬁcation (con-
cepts and social relations as things) from the study of animation (tangible
and intangible things as persons).6 With Marx, I hold that the reifact is a
Fetischcharakter. Reiﬁcation and animation are not mutually exclusive;
they entail each other. This is the crux of fetishism, that performative
universal whose import as a tool for transformation I seek to disclose.
Let us then see how I rescue the concept of reiﬁcation from negativity by
redeﬁning it afresh as fetishism.
Reification, a Universal
I mentioned earlier that Berger, Luckmann and Pullberg argue that
reiﬁcation is a universal phenomenon that recurs in space and time.
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Approaching reiﬁcation from a phenomenological and cognitive per-
spective (the way phenomena appear to human consciousness and
become cognized), Berger and Pullberg (1965) describe reiﬁcation as
the ﬁnal stage in a four-stage process. They call the ﬁrst stage objectiva-
tion because, as they put it, we humans embody our intentionality in
the products we create, from material objects to such abstractions as
names. The second stage, objectiﬁcation, happens at the point in the
process of objectivation in which we distance ourselves from our prod-
ucts and take cognizance of them as objects of consciousness. Now, not
only do we objectivate, but we also recognize our products as such.
Later, in the stage of alienation, as the distance between us and our
products continues to grow, we forget that we ourselves created those
products, which now appear to us in consciousness as ‘alien facticities’.
The fourth and last stage, reiﬁcation, takes place when we begin to
apprehend those things as not only alien but also real.
Take marriage, one of Berger, Luckmann and Pullberg’s favorite
examples of reiﬁcation. The concept of marriage refers to the relation
between spouses, their mutual responsibilities, rights and expectations,
and the countless things they do for and against each other as well as
others, day in, day out. Yet spouses believe that marriage is a thing out
there that predetermines life and relationships, because such is the law,
such is the divine will, such is the way of marriage, or such is, as some
social scientists would put it, the (nearly) universal foundation of kinship
systems. By forgetting that they themselves produce their marriage in the
process of living in a matrimonial relationship, the three sociologists
note, spouses merge with their social role and adopt an attitude of pas-
sivity and detachment toward that role as well as themselves, an attitude
that is inimical to their true nature as human subjects. Thus we have a
linear progression toward increasing levels of concretization as well as
distancing between the producers and their products: objectivation>
objectiﬁcation> alienation> reiﬁcation.
The greater the distance between our products and us, the more
autonomous those products become. Berger, Luckmann and Pullberg
posit the idea that the level of reiﬁcation in social life decreases with
evolutionary time, an uncorroborated assumption that conveniently
explains why it is possible for them, social scientists, to deconstruct
the belief of others in AD 1965–6, straightening the record (Berger
and Luckmann, 1966: 83; Berger and Pullberg, 1965: 208). Their
main point, however, is paramount: ‘As soon as an objective social
world is established, the possibility of reiﬁcation is never far away’
(Berger and Luckmann, 1966: 83). In all times and places, human sub-
jects are prone to reify. They do this by ﬁrst abstracting from the
concrete and then concretizing the abstract (Berger and Pullberg,
1965: 208).7
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Reification and Animation
Having described Berger, Luckmann and Pullberg’s model of reiﬁcation,
which they apply symmetrically to both scientists and what they call the
‘men in the street’, I now ask you to notice an element of negativity and
asymmetry within their theoretical model. The three sociologists explain:
while in the ﬁrst two stages of objectivation and objectiﬁcation the vital
link between human subjects and their products remains intact, in the last
two stages of alienation and reiﬁcation that link is severed, giving rise to
a negative condition deﬁned, in Marxian terms, as profoundly dehuma-
nizing. While the ﬁrst two stages are anthropologically necessary, the last
two stages may be de facto modalities of consciousness but can be over-
come (and the reader is left thinking that they should be overcome, at
least theoretically) if only we realize that we are the sole authors of our
reiﬁed world (Berger and Pullberg, 1965: 208–10). This shift from a neu-
tral cognitive universal to an ideologically laden valuation explains the
negative portrayal of reiﬁcation as dehumanizing.
Berger and Luckmann write: ‘Reiﬁcation can be described as an
extreme step in the process of objectivation, whereby the objectivated
world loses its comprehensibility as a human enterprise and becomes
ﬁxated as a non-human, non-humanizable, inert facticity’ (Berger and
Luckmann, 1966: 83). I concede that the world of reiﬁcation is a world of
things, a world where concepts and relations are turned into things.
These new-made things, however, are far from inert. Did not ‘fetish-
oaths’ (oaths sworn on fetishes) seal deals between European and
African merchants on the ‘Guinea Coast’ of West Africa in the 16th
and 17th centuries? Does not commodity circulation continue to this
day to naturalize the project of capitalism and help people deﬁne their
identity and subjectivity as consumers? Do not social institutions con-
tinue to inﬂuence, if not determine, behavior? A reiﬁed world is not a
world where inert objects abound; a reiﬁed world is a world where ani-
mated objects abound. It is not the objects themselves and the relation
between objects, but the relation between objects and subjects, or reiﬁ-
cation and animation, that invites further consideration.
At this juncture, it is apposite to brieﬂy consider the work of Roy Ellen,
particularly his seminal article ‘Fetishism’ (Ellen, 1988), published 22 years
after The Social Construction of Reality. In this article, Ellen achieves a
double tour de force: he links reiﬁcation and fetishism conceptually, a rare
occurrence, and he turns to positive the negative value of anthropological
asymmetry. Previously, the concept of fetishism had denoted forms of
misapprehension – malthought in cultural evolutionism, disavowal in
psychology and, as we have seen, false consciousness in Marxism. Ellen
eﬀectively turns ‘fetishism’ to a positive cognitive universal.
Note that in order to achieve his double tour de force, Ellen bans all
traces of Marxian ideology from his approach even though he shares
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with those theorists his identity as a modern. It is worth comparing Ellen
with Berger, Luckmann and Pullberg: much like the three sociologists,
Ellen develops a model that is linear and fourfold. Yet he does not shift
values from positive to negative but ensures that his model remains con-
tinuous from beginning to end.
In a nutshell, Ellen argues: humans are cognitively programmed to
start with percepts, or the most elementary of categories dependent on
sense perception, be they natural or social kinds, parts of things, or
attributes. These categories they quickly reify as things or reifacts, then
go on to materialize as icons, and ﬁnally to concretize as fetishes. While
the icon represents an abstraction, the fetish is the abstraction. As Ellen
puts it, the fetish is born when humans conﬂate the signiﬁer and the
signiﬁed, when the material object becomes animated. Thus we have
the sequence: percepts> reifacts> icons> fetishes. Ellen sees fetishism
as a universal and, much like Berger, Luckmann and Pullberg did for
reiﬁcation, he perceives fetishism in terms of the linear progression con-
crete> abstract> concrete. Unlike Berger, Luckmann and Pullberg,
however, Ellen does not diagnose a worrisome distancing between the
producers and their products. More neutral, he traces a straight line
toward the material thing in itself, thus not only achieving a truly positive
anthropological symmetry but also linking reiﬁcation and animation in
the same conceptual model. The fetish is now the exact point where the
material object becomes animated. The fetishized world is now a world of
subjects (animated objects) and not a world of inert objects, as claimed
by the sociologists.
Ellen’s model, however, ultimately misrepresents the relation between
reiﬁcation and animation as well as the ethnography. Consider the
ancestral world of the Luvale-speaking peoples of northwest Zambia,
among whom I work. Were I to apply Ellen’s linear, fourfold model to
that world, I would start with the mufu, the dead person. When a
person (mutu) dies, becoming a dead person (mufu), his or her life
force (mwono) changes into an ancestor (mukulu). (The remaining
inert body, which the relatives of the deceased will bury, is not the
mufu but the chivimbi, or corpse.) An ancestor is abstracted from the
concrete, perceptual reality of a dead person. It is then concretized
again (reiﬁed) in the form of an autonomous entity and ontological
category known as mukulu. Ancestors bear the names and social iden-
tity of dead persons, reside about the village or underground (opinions
diﬀer), and watch over their descendants with great interest. They care
that the living live in harmony and behave according to shared rules of
social and moral comportment. Should the living quarrel or disrespect
one another, or forget their ancestors in their heart and fail to invoke
them in words and inherit their names, their ancestors will punish them
in the form of disease, reproductive disorders or bad luck when
hunting.
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Noticeably, as punitive agents, the ancestors come out in the form of
certain prototypical manifestations known as mahamba.8 Unlike the
ancestors, who are idealized versions of individual dead persons,
mahamba are known by a limited number of standard names as well as
the physical symptoms they bring upon those they catch. Kula, for exam-
ple, is a lihamba (singular of mahamba) who causes menstrual and repro-
ductive disorders in women. Kayongo, the lihamba associated with
basket divination, causes pains in the chest, breathing diﬃculties and
possibly lunacy. In addition to manifesting themselves as diseased
bodies, mahamba come out in the form of material objects during
ritual ceremonies. In the world of basket divination, Kayongo’s most
remarkable material expression is no doubt the lipele, a personiﬁed
basket containing 30 or so symbolic articles, from wooden ﬁgurines
and colonial coins to animal claws. Divination baskets take part in
se´ances as well as other rituals associated with Kayongo (Silva, 2011).
Thus we have mufu>mukulu> lihamba> lipele. The ancestral world
of northwest Zambia leads us to modify Ellen’s model of fetishism by
recognizing two moments in the process of conceptual reiﬁcation (ﬁrst
mukulu, then lihamba) and omitting the stage of iconiﬁcation. But these
adjustments do not invalidate Ellen’s model or obfuscate what he sees as
the linear movement toward the most characteristic and developed form
of fetishism – the lipele in the universe of basket divination. Like the
shields of the Nuaulu of Seram, so beautifully described by Ellen (1990),
the divination baskets of the Luvale-speaking peoples of northwest
Zambia are no mere icons, images, signs or indexes of their animating
spirit, Kayongo. They are Kayongo.
At ﬁrst, the ethnography just presented makes good sense. One could
even argue symmetrically that such linear processes of reiﬁcation recur in
space and time. Think of the fate of the dead in Western Europe and
North America. Today (much like the ancestors in Zambia), the dead
continue to be abstracted from the multifaceted reality of particular indi-
viduals, transformed into idealized persons and then materialized in the
form of the belongings of the dead, their favorites objects, or maybe their
photographs. Roman Catholics continue to canonize as saints those who
lived ‘lives of great charity and heroic virtues’ and, in some cases, to
subsequently honor them with material bodies in the form of statues.
On a closer look, however, if one cares to listen to what people say and
observe what they do, one will realize that the relation between reiﬁcation
and animation is not linear. Neither is it locked in the material world, as
Ellen argues. Reiﬁcation is entailed with animation in whatever realm it
appears, material or immaterial, visible or invisible. All reifacts are ani-
mated to some degree. Some reifacts are even personiﬁed. Analytically, it
may seem that we reify in order to animate, a process that suggests a
temporal and causal relation in which animation negates or surmounts
reiﬁcation. Experientially, however, reiﬁcation and animation are best
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described as a simultaneity, a co-presence, a coincidence, even – moment-
arily – a unity. There is no linear movement from reifact to fetish. There
is only the mutual entailment and aﬃrmation of reiﬁcation and anima-
tion in diﬀerent realms of existence, material and immaterial, and the
expression of that entailment in the modes that are possible in those
realms. Thus we have: fetish> fetish> fetish; which is to say, fetish.
In my descriptive account of the universe of ancestors and their mani-
festations in northwest Zambia, presented above, I led you to see a linear
movement from the concrete reality of the dead person to the concrete
reality of the personiﬁed material object (the fetish) via the abstraction of
the mukulu ancestor and his or her mahamba manifestations (the rei-
facts). This linear movement is an artifact of Ellen’s model (and, likely,
of the interviewing process during ﬁeldwork as well). Now I ask that you
notice the mutual entailment of reiﬁcation and animation at work not
only in the material realm of the divination basket but also in the imma-
terial realm of the ancestors and their manifestations. Ancestor the rei-
fact is also ancestor the fetish: An ancestor is simultaneously an alien
facticity and a personiﬁed entity named after a dead person and endowed
with a keen sense of observation, judgment and morality, as well as a
harsh personality. Mahamba the reifacts are also mahamba the fetishes:
Again, as autonomous ontological entities, the origins of mahamba as
human products are lost to consciousness. Yet mahamba are fully ani-
mated and even personiﬁed, having names of their own, idiosyncratic
personality traits and the power to act. Kayongo is cruel and pitiless.
He likes blood and other things red, from iron oxide to the scarlet wing
feathers of the touraco; and he will kill you, slowly. Then, as mentioned,
there is the lipele. This material oracle is a reifact because it results from
the materialization of an abstraction – lihamba Kayongo. Yet, being a
reifact, it is also fully animated and personiﬁed. During se´ances, the lipele
listens to the diviner’s questions and responds in the form of meaningful
conﬁgurations of small material articles. The lipele also goes through a
life course that includes a nightlong ceremony of initiation into adult-
hood and a special burial to signal its death (Silva, 2011).
In sum, there is no movement toward the thing in itself. There is only
an array of manifestations of the same phenomenon in diﬀerent realms of
existence – realms that people distinguish, no doubt, much as they dis-
tinguish persons and things (vatu and vyuma), without permanently ﬁxing
the distinctions. Fetishes are fetishes regardless of their diﬀerent
expressions.
The analytical traditions of fetishism predispose us to locate fetishes in
the material, tangible world. But we should not let the scandalous pres-
ence of the fetish-object blind us from seeing other fetishes in the non-
material world. In all realms of existence, the universal human tendency
to reify and the universal human tendency to animate converge and
intertwine to the point where there is not one without the other, to the
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point where they coincide and may, momentarily, become one. Ours is a
world of converging diﬀerences and relative discontinuities. It is a world
where the correlated distinctions between subjects and objects, material-
ity and immateriality, ritual and religion, cognition and acts, and con-
sciousness and practice may be stressed or eﬀaced, conﬁrmed or
surpassed.
I opened this article with the following statement: to speak of fetishism
is to speak of the larger whole of reiﬁcation. Having reconsidered these
concepts in conversation with moderns from a nonmodern perspective, I
am now led to the opposite conclusion: to speak of reiﬁcation is to speak
of the larger whole of fetishism. We humans reify and animate all the
time. We are master fetishists.
Control and Surrender
It is now time to return to Berger, Luckmann and Pullberg to broach
another point of disagreement between us. I quote Berger and Luckmann
once more: ‘The reiﬁed world is, by deﬁnition, a dehumanized world. It is
experienced by man as a strange facticity, an opus alienum over which he
has no control rather than as the opus proprium of his own productive
activity’ (Berger and Luckmann, 1966: 82–3). One year earlier Berger and
Pullberg had written: ‘In producing an alienated world, the human is
devalued and a humanity is produced that is characterized by inert
objectivity’ (Berger and Pullberg, 1965: 204). All three sociologists
stress that reiﬁcation is dehumanizing because when we forget that we
are the sole authors of our products, we forget ourselves as subjects and
become objects both to ourselves and to others. The social world
becomes a world of objects, a strange world over which we have no
control.
Many of you who live in Europe and North America will be familiar
with this discourse of reiﬁcation (or objectiﬁcation in today’s parlance).
After the long eclipse that followed the 1960s, the discourse of reiﬁcation,
according to the philosopher Axel Honneth (2008: 17–21), is back again.
Scholars as well as artists have returned to this old idea, and there has
been much talk about the vexed problem of the objectiﬁcation, commod-
itization and traﬃcking of human beings and their body parts. These are
serious matters that unleash suﬀering and consternation. This said, it is
important to realize that reiﬁcation is not coextensive with its expression
as a passive, dehumanizing condition in European and North American
recent history. In positive symmetrical perspective, reiﬁcation (redeﬁned
as fetishism) is best described in non-judgmental and non-partisan terms
as an act of invested engagement in the world in the hope of ensuring
some measure of control. Wherever you go, whichever country you visit,
you will ﬁnd people living their lives in particular circumstances, trying to
be heard, struggling to accomplish small and large goals, hoping to make
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a diﬀerence. It is in those particular circumstances that people, including
scientists, actively fetishize. This accomplishment is possible because
where there is reiﬁcation, there is animation, as shown, and where
there is animation there is engagement, investment and empowerment
in the hope of transformation.
I should clarify at this juncture that transformation is not always
positive on political and moral grounds. I noted the objectiﬁcation, com-
moditization and even traﬃcking of human beings, processes in which
people are shamelessly belittled, degraded, silenced and exploited. And
we all know of reiﬁed concepts that have led to personal and collective
suﬀering, if not horror. Think of the portrayal of Tutsis as ‘cockroaches’
by the Hutus prior to the Rwandan genocide. Think of the thousands of
so-called ‘fallen women’ in 20th-century Ireland who were sent to the
Magdalene asylums, true camps of forced labor and systematic dehu-
manization. Think of the innumerable students in the high schools of
the United States and other countries who are called ‘nerds’, ‘weirdos’
and whatnot, in addition to suﬀering other forms of bullying. Such nega-
tive reifacts as ‘cockroaches’, ‘fallen women’ and ‘weirdos’ share with
positive reifacts the important fact that they engender change and trans-
formation. We may say that degrading reifacts are mere distortions that
say and reveal nothing. We may say that they are mere illusions or self-
aggrandizing delusions. For the sake of the Tutsis, the Irish women, the
American high school students and all of us, we should recognize, as they
do, that such distortions are very serious and very real, that negative
reiﬁcation does things, from injuring the victims and empowering the
perpetrators to reproducing the conditions under which such acts
become possible.
And this observation leads us to the important point that reiﬁcation,
cognitively predicated though it may be, is always enacted contextually.
Only by considering the critical contexts – historical, sociocultural, pol-
itical, economic, interactional and existential – in which subjects who are
also objects engage with objects who are also subjects in pursuit of trans-
formation, positive or negative, can we possibly comprehend the univer-
sal impetus to fetishize.
Consider again the ancestral world of northwest Zambia. Ancestors
and their mahamba manifestations enable transformation and an accrued
sense of control in highly particular social contexts and existential cir-
cumstances. Outside these contexts and these circumstances (which is to
say, in scholarly writing), the ancestral world becomes reiﬁed as an onto-
logical ﬂux endlessly turning from ancestral spirit to human body to
material object and back again, continually ﬂowing and coagulating
with neither direction nor purpose.
There are at least three critical contexts without which this ancestral
world remains eerily adrift: the ﬁrst context is the suﬀering human body.
Mahamba make themselves known in the form of physical symptoms:
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fever, headaches, respiratory disorders, chest pain, miscarriages, barren-
ness, sores and boils, lunacy. Mahamba are felt and endured before they
are cognized. The second context is ritual. As the symptoms worsen and
the aﬄicted person begins to waste away, his or her relatives will likely
consult a basket diviner to identify the agent behind so much suﬀering.
Should that agent be an ancestor, the diviner will also pin down the
speciﬁc lihamba mode in which the ancestor has emerged and prescribe
the conduction of a healing ritual known by the name of that lihamba.
During the healing ritual, people will sing and clap, play the drums,
invoke their ancestor, and manipulate myriad substances and objects,
hoping to appease and persuade the lihamba to come out in the form
of material objects and, in some cases, possession trance. Now, in local
understanding, none of the above can be understood outside the larger
context of social relations. This is the third context. The consulted diviner
will have informed his clients that ancestor so-and-so came out as
lihamba so-and-so because his or her descendants harbored ill feelings
toward one another or forgot to honor their ancestor. In addition to
possible herbal treatments, healing requires both the performance of
the prescribed ritual and the resolution (in theory at least) of the festering
interpersonal animosities that led to the problem in the ﬁrst place. Body,
ritual and social relations: these are three of the critical contexts without
which fetishism, in the particular context of illness and misfortune caused
by ancestors in northwest Zambia, would vanish into thin air.
I thus far have argued that reiﬁcation, being the converse of anima-
tion, does not lead to the dehumanization of the world but to the human-
ization of the world; that we fetishize when we want to accomplish a goal,
to persuade, demean, heal, ﬁnd comfort, control, transform; and that it is
not possible to understand the signiﬁcance of fetishism in social life with-
out considering the multiplicity of contexts in which it is bound to
appear. My next point follows: if, as I have argued, reiﬁcation and ani-
mation entail and aﬃrm each other, reiﬁcation is not an impediment to
action but a condition for action.
In fairness, I should say that Berger, Luckmann and Pullberg explicitly
recognize the link between reiﬁcation and social action. ‘We ourselves
produce the world from which we are alienated’, Berger and Pullberg
(1965: 203) write. ‘Even while apprehending the world in reiﬁed terms,
man continues to produce it’, Berger and Luckmann (1966: 83) note. The
problem, from my perspective, is that the three sociologists see reiﬁcation
as an entirely negative condition, deﬁning it, for example, in the words of
Berger and Pullberg, as ‘objectiﬁcation in an alienated mode’ (Berger and
Pullberg, 1965: 200) or as the very moment in which ‘the dialectical
process in its totality [‘‘men’’ producing society and society producing
‘‘men’’] is lost’ (Berger and Pullberg, 1965: 207). Hence their viewing of
the link between reiﬁcation and social action as a paradox, a social world
that is produced by objects.
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Underlying this negative, asymmetrical view of social reiﬁcation is the
deep-rooted Hegelian idea that subjects are not only opposed to objects
as distinct ontological categories, but also stand over and above objects.
In Marxian terms, subjects should never forget their authorship of the
world, forget themselves in their forgetfulness, adopt an attitude of pas-
sivity and detachment (a ‘contemplative stance’ in the words of Luka´cs
[1971 (1923): 98]), spend their lives in a mystiﬁed, ultimately diminishing
mode. Subjects should never become objects. But what if this view of
social life is distorted? What if objects are also subjects, and subjects,
objects? What if in order to become a subject one must become an object?
What if in order to act one must withdraw?
My engagement with the ideas of select moderns has persuaded me
that reiﬁcation does involve the forgetting of our authorship of the social
world and our withdrawal into passivity, processes that Luka´cs identi-
ﬁed. We may even describe reiﬁcation as alienating in the sense that the
products we create appear to us as alien facticities, as Berger, Luckmann
and Pullberg described. At the same time, however, we must recognize
that reiﬁcation is a process of active involvement in the world in search of
transformation. Both sides are constitutive of reiﬁcation redeﬁned as
fetishism. Action and withdrawal are mutually entailed. There is nothing
paradoxical here.
Neither is there anything paradoxical in the fact that people both con-
trol and are controlled by the fetishes they create (‘this paradoxical tension
is very characteristic of fetishes’, Ellen writes [1988: 229]). It is true that all
fetishes reduce our choices and freedom to act as autonomous subjects,
which we never are. It is equally true that we act through them, that we
produce the world through them, that we change the world through them.
In his devastating critique of modernity, Latour (2010: 11) urges us to
detoxify ourselves of the drug of mastery (his metaphor), which the mod-
erns see as the locus of subjectivity and control over facts and nature in
opposition to that other drug of theirs, alienation. But does the import-
ant work of deconstructing the belief in belief require that we discard
these old concepts and the insights that they oﬀer? Why should we not
engage with them, recycle them, turn them inside out, if that will take us
to where we want and need to go? Once recycled and neutralized as forms
of control and surrender, mastery and alienation are mutually entailed
instead of mutually exclusive. Rather than standing along in a kingly
posture, mastery entails and presupposes the humbling alienation of
the subject. Nowhere is there sweet without sour, up without down,
light without darkness, taking without giving, action without coercion,
revolution without oppression, learning without suﬀering. Nowhere is
there control without surrender.
I came to this realization in northwest Zambia, where the necessity of
withdrawal in the process of engagement is given elaborate cultural
expression in so-called rituals of aﬄiction (Janzen, 1992; Turner, 1968).
92 Theory, Culture & Society 30(1)
Those of you who are familiar with the early work of anthropologist
Victor Turner among the Ndembu of northwest Zambia (an ethnic
group that is socially and historically related to the Luvale-speaking
peoples) will recall that rituals of aﬄiction are long, complex perform-
ances for healing the ills caused by an ancestor (Turner, 1968). You will
also recall that the aﬄicted, once healed, become healers. Illness is the
pathway to ritual expertise. Suﬀering is the pathway to knowledge and
social recognition.
The same ethos reappears in several ritual domains. During ritual, the
same lihamba that punished you in the form of disease will take hold of
you in the form of possession trance in order to cure you. (Here, the
process of reiﬁcation is complete because the sick person, once possessed
in the form of trance, completely loses both control and self-awareness.)
All this so you can be healed and become a ritual expert. Equally notori-
ous are the prescriptions and proscriptions that accompany ritual work
and life as a healer. Marxist anthropologist Maurice Godelier states,
‘Taboos, prohibitions, constraints do not mean any restriction of
power, rather an accumulation of it’ (Godelier, 1977: 179). They mean
both. There is no power without obligation.
In sum, in animating their spirits, people in northwest Zambia will-
ingly surrender to regain some degree of control – much in the same way
that people do in capitalist societies in animating their commodities. The
diﬀerences between these points of comparison are many, of course, one
in particular coming to mind: in northwest Zambia, the loss of control is
experienced and verbally described as suﬀering, whereas in Europe and
North America that loss is often described as apathy, detachment, numb-
ness, sleepwalking – in short, a disturbing if oddly painless condition.
Maybe the rituals of aﬄiction in northwest Zambia will inspire social
theorists of late capitalism to reckon with the suﬀering that lies restless
just beneath the skin, and to conceptualize that suﬀering as an existential
powerhouse and a political weapon.
Transformation
Karl Marx symmetrically explained capitalism in the light of ‘the mist-
enveloped regions of the religious world’. I hope that my brief, equally
symmetrical accounts of fetishism in Africa in the light of Marxian writ-
ings will be of relevance to those readers, critical or agnostic, who share
an interest in fetishism and reiﬁcation in diﬀerent times and places,
including Europe and North America.
I also hope to have succeeded in converting the asymmetry that under-
lies Marxian writings on reiﬁcation to a vigorous positive symmetry.
To this end, I developed a critique of the old Marxian view of reiﬁcation
as an attitude of detachment and passivity, a view ﬁrst theorized by
Luka´cs for the historical conditions of late capitalism and later modiﬁed
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by Berger, Luckmann and Pullberg to a de facto, if depoliticized, univer-
sal. In addition, I redeﬁned reiﬁcation as the reverse of animation. I
gained this insight from the ancestral world of northwest Zambia as
much as from Marx, who, in Capital, not coincidentally, preferred the
concept of fetishism (Fetischismus) to reiﬁcation (Verdinglichung). In the
middle, where the critical and the agnostic meet and dialogue, reiﬁcation
is no longer a sign of paralysis, an obstacle to revolutionary conscious-
ness, a bad omen. Reiﬁcation is a form of action and a tool for trans-
formation, positive or negative, revolutionary or reactionary, substantial
or minuscule.
There is much to gain from recycling the old concept of reiﬁcation
from the wasteland of modernity and dissociating it from other germane
concepts such as mystiﬁcation and false consciousness. Only in this way
will we not sever ‘the comprehensive process involving [the objectivity of
social existence and its relatedness to human subjectivity] in an inextric-
able interrelatedness’, as Berger and Pullberg (1965: 197) describe the
dialects of social life. Only in this way will we not forget that reiﬁcation
is the reversal of animation, that the reifact is a Fetischcharakter, and
that reiﬁcation is not an impediment to action but a condition for action.
To advocate, as I am doing here, a non-partisan and non-judgmental
stance in the study of reiﬁcation does not necessarily imply disengage-
ment and apathy. Social scientists (particularly if they want change)
should recognize that reiﬁcation is a powerful means of intervention.
Reifacts-fetishes most certainly enable the realization and extension of
diﬀerent forms of subjectivity and collective consciousness, forms that
critical theorists may downplay as a distraction from the larger social
issues that matter or straightforwardly condemn for facilitating the
reproduction of the status quo and its acceptance as natural and inevit-
able. The solution to those reportedly distracting acts of fetishism, how-
ever, is not to eradicate fetishism from social life, for fetishism is part of
who we are and the way we act.
Fetishism is also part of who scholars are and what they do, of course,
as Berger, Luckmann and Pullberg readily acknowledged (Berger and
Luckmann, 1966: 83–4; Berger and Pullberg, 1965: 205). Scholars are
likely to reify their theoretical concepts, the tools of their trade, in add-
ition to their other reifying peccadillos committed while they are not
being scholars. ‘Culture’ leads to social violence, one scholar argues;
‘the social environment x’ produces excellence in sports, another scholar
asserts; ‘the super-ego’ inﬂuences behavior, yet another scholar main-
tains. Marxian scholars reify the concept of reiﬁcation as a magical
force that turns people into objects but can, as well, in the hands of
scholars, become a political tool that does things in the world, or
could do things in the world if only the reiﬁed masses cared to listen –
the concept of reiﬁcation is another reifact, another fetish. The concept
of reiﬁcation as a political weapon is per force reiﬁed.
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The problem, then, is not reiﬁcation per se, which is colorblind, but
what we do with it, for what reason, and to what purpose. Inspired by
Gayatri Spivak’s (1996 [1985]: 214) notion of ‘strategic essentialism’, I
would therefore advocate not the eradication of reiﬁcation once and for
all, a doomed aspiration, but the responsible, critical and strategic
deployment of reiﬁcation as a tool for transformation.
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Notes
1. For a genealogy of Marx’s interest in fetishism (the analogy between econ-
omy and religion), see Pietz (1993).
2. According to political theorist Hanna Pitkin, Marx used the concept of reifi-
cation in one casual passage in Capital, vol. III, chapter 48, ‘where Marx calls
the ‘‘reification [Verdinglichung] of social relationships’’ a ‘‘mystification’’
whereby the elements in the economist’s ‘‘trinity formula’’ – capital, land,
and labor – are ‘‘automized and ossified’’ in an ‘‘enchanted and inverted
world’’’ (Pitkin, 1987: 264, quoting Marx).
3. In addition to Berger and Pullberg (1965), Berger and Luckmann (1966),
Luka´cs (1971 [1923]) and Marx (1936 [1867]), see the following key references
on reification: Adorno (1978, 2009 [1952]); Adorno and Horkheimer (2002
[1944]); Benjamin (1999); Bewes (2002); Gabel (1975); Honneth (2008);
Jameson (1981); Pitkin (1987); Thomason (1982); and Woodard (1935).
4. On fetishism, see Blier (1995); Ellen (1988, 1990); Gell (1998); Godelier
(1977); Goldman (2009); Graeber (2005); Hornborg (2006); Keane (1998,
2007); Latour (1993, 1999, 2010); Jackson (1998); MacGaffey (1990, 2000);
Morgan (2010); Ochoa (2007, 2010); Pels (1998); Pietz (1985, 1987, 1988,
1993); Schiermer (2011); Silva (2011); and Taussig (1980).
5. For a similar attempt to bridge the insights of moderns and nonmoderns in
the study of fetishism, see Bjørn Schiermer’s (2011) thought-provoking essay
‘Quasi-objects, cult-objects and fashion objects: on two kinds of fetishism on
display in modern culture’.
6. The tendency to separate reification and animation as topics of study has
given rise to two distinct and by and large mutually oblivious traditions of
scholarship (see the references in notes 3 and 4, above). Noticeable exceptions
to this general pattern are Brown (2006), Ellen (1988, 1990) and Pels et al.
(2002).
7. In addition to Berger, Luckmann and Pullberg, other authors who proclaim
the universality and necessity of reification are Alfred Schutz (see Thomason,
1982: 88–138) and Joseph Gabel (1975: 155). More recently, writing at the
center of the materialist turn in social and cultural theory, Bruno Latour
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(1993, 1999, 2010) and Dick Pels (2002), to name only two, have argued that
the answer to the old problem of what holds human societies together lies
precisely in the fixity of material things.
8. For key references on ancestors and ancestral manifestations in northwest
Zambia, see Silva (2011), Turner (1968), Wastiau (2000) and White (1948,
1949, 1961).
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